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I. INTRODUCTION
Attorney's fees are near and dear to the hearts of most lawyers, and an
award of fees by the court is much desired among attorneys. A decision that
awards attorney's fees stipulates that one party will pay the other party's
legal costs and expenses. An award for attorney's fees allows attorneys to
satisfy their clients, and at the same time, ensure their own payment.
A. The American Rule
Prior to the American Revolution, the courts in the American colonies
followed the "'English Rule"' and customarily awarded attorney's fees to the
prevailing party in civil cases.' However, the institution of a new govern-
* Katherine H. Miller, J.D. Candidate 2005, Nova Southeastern University, Shepard
Broad Law Center; B.A., Oglethorpe University.
1. Fla. Patient's Comp. Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145, 1147-48 (Fla. 1985).
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ment, and new courts in the United States, ended the reliance on this British
tradition.2 The majority of American courts branched off from the traditional
"'English Rule' and ceased in the award of fees to prevailing parties.
3
In Florida, the courts follow the common law "'American Rule"' re-
garding the entitlement to attorney's fees. Usually fees are only awarded if
there is an exception to the common law rule.' An exception can be imposed
by either the judiciary6 or the legislature,7 or by contractual agreement be-
tween the parties.8
B. Section 768.79 of the Florida Statutes and Rule 1.442 of the Florida
Rules of Civil Procedure
The most common exceptions to the "American Rule" are created by
the legislature.9 Section 768.79 of the Florida Statutes is one such legislative
exception that awards fees for offers of judgment.'0 An offer of judgment is
"[a] settlement offer by one party to allow a specified judgment to be taken
against the party, ' ' and the words offer of judgment" are sometimes used
interchangeably with demand for judgment 3 or proposal for settlement. 4
Section 768.79 stipulates that a party is entitled to fees and costs if it serves
an offer of judgment that is not accepted within thirty days, and the resulting
court judgment is either twenty-five percent greater than or less than the of-
fered judgment depending upon the party. 5 This section of the Florida Stat-
utes is applied through the procedural power of rule 1.442 of the Florida
Rules of Civil Procedure. 6
2. Id. at 1148.
3. Id.
4. Dade County v. Pefia, 664 So. 2d 959, 960 (Fla. 1995) (citing Rowe, 472 So. 2d at
1148).
5. Id.
6. See Bitterman v. Bitterman, 714 So. 2d 356, 365 (Fla. 1998). The judiciary has im-
posed one small exception to the American Rule, and, in a very narrow scope, judges are
permitted to award fees based on a party's wrongdoing. Id. This rare type of judgment is
called "[t]he inequitable conduct doctrine [and] permits the award of attorney's fees where
one party has exhibited egregious conduct or acted in bad faith." Id.
7. Peha, 664 So. 2d at 960.
8. Rowe, 472 So. 2d at 1148.
9. See Peha, 664 So. 2d at 960.
10. See FLA. STAT. § 768.79(1) (2002).
11. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1112 (7th ed. 1999).
12. § 768.79.
13. Id.
14. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.442.
15. See § 768.79(1).
16. See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.442.
[Vol. 28:3:841
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The award of attorney's fees becomes a penalty for a party who neglects
to accept the offer of judgment to end the case. 7 However, offers of judg-
ment were not designed as devices of intimidation. 8 Their purpose is "as a
tool of encourage[ment]" to persuade the parties to settle. 9 It is beneficial to
all parties to "terminate all claims, end disputes, and obviate the need for
further intervention of the judicial process."2° Costs, attorney's fees, and
extensive time can all be saved with a resolution through an offer of judg-
ment. Thus, there is quite a bit of persuasion for all parties involved to at-
tempt to settle a dispute before actually progressing with litigation.
This article will discuss awards of attorney's fees for offers of judgment
in Florida. Although there have been various notes of contention about this
type of award, this piece will focus primarily on the conflict of apportioning
the offer of judgment among all parties. Part I1 of this article separately ana-
lyzes the history of section 768.79 of the Florida Statutes and rule 1.442 of
the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, and then studies how the two function
together for an award of attorney's fees. Part III specifically focuses on ap-
portioning offers of judgment among multiple parties. It looks at the treat-
ment of the issue by various District Courts of Appeal, focusing on whether
they strictly construed the apportionment requirement, or found an exception.
Part IV will discuss Willis Shaw Express, Inc. v. Hilyer Sod, Inc.,2' the case
in which the Supreme Court of Florida attempted to finally resolve the ap-
portionment issue. It will also analyze lingering questions that are evident
among the Florida District Courts of Appeal after the Willis Shaw Express,
Inc. (" Willis Shaw") decision.
II. COMBINING THE STATUTE AND THE RULE
While section 768.79 of the Florida Statutes provides the substantive
law for offers of judgment, rule 1.442 of the Florida Rules of Civil Proce-
dure presents the means of properly applying the statute.22 Because rule
1.442 supplements section 768.79, the two function mutually, and when pro-
17. Julie H. Littky-Rubin, Proposals for Settlement: Minding Your P's and Q's Under
Rule 1.442, 75 FLA. B.J. 12 (Feb. 2001) (citing Abbott & Purdy Group Inc. v. Bell, 738 So. 2d
1024, 1026 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999)).
18. Kaufman v. Smith, 693 So. 2d 133, 134 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (Hazouri, J.,
concurring) (suggesting that the statute should do more to clarify the purpose of the rule).
19. Id.
20. Unicare Health Facilities, Inc. v. Mort, 553 So. 2d 159, 161 (Fla. 1989).
21. 849 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 2003), reh'g denied, No. SC02-1521, 2003 Fla. LEXIS 1168, at
* I (Fla. June 26, 2003).
22. Gary M. Pappas & Joye B. Walford, Trial Lawyers Forum, Proposals for Settlement
- More Traps for the Unwary, 76 FLA. B.J. 69 (Dec. 2002).
2004]
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posing an offer of judgment, it is always best to use them together, and refer
to both, to prevent any mistakes or unnecessary misunderstandings.23
A. Section 768.79 of the Florida Statutes
Through section 768.79 of the Florida Statutes, the Florida Legislature
implemented a compulsory right to attorney's fees, if the requirements of the
statute have been fulfilled.24 Although section 768.79 is found in the negli-
gence section, in Title XLV, of the Florida Statutes, there is no uncertainty
in the language of section 768.79, which declares it applicable "[i]n any civil
action for damages filed in the courts of this state ....""
The Fourth District Court of Appeal addressed this language in Beyel
Bros. Crane & Rigging Co. of South Florida v. Ace Transportation, Inc.,26
and found section 768.79 unambiguous and comprehensive in scope, holding
it applicable to all civil actions in Florida where one party claims damages
from another.27 In Beyel Bros., the district court overruled the circuit court's
holding that section 768.79 was only applicable to negligence, and indicated
the extensive scope of the section. 8 In its decision, the district court noted
that in 1990 the legislature had specifically changed the wording of section
768.79 to include all civil actions, 29 in contrast to the earlier version that only
applied section 768.79 to the negligence part of the Florida Statutes.3"
Section 768.79 of the Florida Statutes applies to all parties, either plain-
tiff or defendant, who file offers of judgment.3' Also, the offer of judgment
will still be valid even if it is a joint offer.3 2 If the defendant in a civil action
files an offer of judgment which is not accepted by the plaintiff
within 30 days, the defendant shall be entitled to recover reason-
able costs and attorney's fees incurred by her or him or on the de-
fendant's behalf . . . from the date of filing of the offer if the
23. Littky-Rubin, supra note 17, at 14.
24. See TGI Friday's, Inc. v. Dvorak, 663 So. 2d 606, 611 (Fla. 1995); Schmidt v.
Fortner, 629 So. 2d 1036, 1040 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
25. § 768.79(l).
26. 664 So. 2d 62 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
27. Id. at 64.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. See § 768.79(1).
32. V.I.P. Real Estate Corp. v. Fla. Executive Realty Mgmt. Corp., 650 So. 2d 199, 201
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (per curiam).
[Vol. 28:3:841
4
Nova Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 3 [2004], Art. 16
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol28/iss3/16
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judgment is one of no liability or the judgment obtained by the
plaintiff is at least 25 percent less than such offer.33
The same is true for a plaintiff:
[i]f a plaintiff files a demand for judgment which is not accepted
by the defendant within 30 days and the plaintiff recovers a judg-
ment in an amount at least 25 percent greater than the offer, she or
he shall be entitled to recover reasonable costs and attorney's fees
incurred from the date of the filing of the demand.34
Thus, section 768.79 establishes an "'entitlement' to fees,"' 35 which is
determined by the judgment, subject to any payments received or settlement
amounts.3 6 However, the judgment is not measured by the jury verdict, 37 and
section 768.79 does not apply to a voluntary dismissal where there would be
no finding of liability, unless it is dismissed with prejudice.38
After the basic circumstances of entitlement are established, section
768.79 of the Florida Statutes provides four requirements that an offer must
fulfill in order to be used as the basis for an award of attorney's fees and
costs. 39 First, to be in full compliance, an offer must reference section
768.79, and be in writing.4" Second, it needs to state the names of the offeror
and the offeree.4 ' Also, the offer must "[s]tate with particularity the amount
offered to settle a claim for punitive damages," and finally, to comply with
the section 768.79, an offer has to "[s]tate its total amount., 42 If the offer
complies with the four elements, the statutory requirements are met, and at-
torney's fees should be awarded.
In Schmidt v. Fortner,43 the Fourth District Court of Appeal addressed
the basic fulfillment of section 768.79 requirements and found a basis for an
offer of judgment where the amount of the offer was in the general range of
the value of the missing assets.44 The court held that an award of fees only
33. § 768.79(1).
34. Id.
35. Schmidt v. Fortner, 629 So. 2d 1036, 1040 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
36. § 768.79(6)(b).
37. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Sutton, 707 So. 2d 760, 761 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (citing
Stewart v. Progressive Am. Ins. Co., 595 So. 2d 272 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992)).
38. MX lnvs., Inc. v. Crawford, 700 So. 2d 640, 642 (Fla. 1997).
39. See § 768.79(2)(a)-(d).
40. § 768.79(2)(a).
41. § 768.79(2)(b).
42. § 768.79(2)(c)-(d).
43. 629 So. 2d 1036 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
44. Id. at 1039.
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hinges on the amount offered and the amount of the judgment, not on the
reasonableness of the offer.45 Two years later, the Supreme Court of Florida
followed the holding in Schmidt, and upheld the constitutionality of section
768.79 in TGI Friday's, Inc. v. Dvorak.46 In Dvorak, the Supreme Court of
Florida ruled that the only way a court could refuse to award fees under sec-
tion 768.79 was if the offeror did not make the offer in good faith.47
However, good faith is not an easy determination, and each case must
be examined in depth, on its own merits.48 In Fox v. McCaw Cellular
Communications of Florida, Inc.," the defendants gave the plaintiffs an offer
of judgment for $100, which strictly followed the statutory requirements of
section 768.79.50 The plaintiffs argued that the offer was not made in good
faith because of the proposal's nominal amount, but the Fourth District Court
of Appeal disagreed." The court reasoned that if the offeror "had a reason-
able basis at the time of the offer to conclude that their exposure was nomi-
nal," the offer was in good faith." Because the offer of $100 was in good
faith, with a reasonable basis, the court in Fox agreed that the defendant was
entitled to fees.13  Accordingly, awards for offers of judgment, pursuant to
section 768.69, are based solely on the statutory requirements, without room
for judges' discretion. 4
45. Id. at 1039-40. The district court stated:
To require the exacting proof that a prima facie case entails would be both contrary to the text
and quite antithetical to the purpose and intent of the statute. It would clearly discourage mak-
ing good faith offers of seulement early in a case, i.e. before the parties have expended sub-
stantial sums in attorney's fees and costs for discovery and preparation for trial.
id. at 1039.
46. 663 So. 2d 606, 611 (Fla. 1995).
47. Id. (citing Schmidt v. Fortner, 629 So. 2d 1036, 1040 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993)).
The Supreme Court of Florida reasoned "the statute as a whole leaves no doubt that the rea-
sonableness of the rejection is irrelevant to the question of entitlement. However, it is equally
clear that these enumerated factors are intended to be considered in the determination of the
amount of the fee to be awarded." Id. at 613.
48. Fox v. McCaw Cellular Communications of Fla., Inc., 745 So. 2d 330, 333 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (per curiam).
49. Jd. at 330.
50. Id. at 333.
51. Id.
52. Id.; accord State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Marko, 695 So. 2d 874 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1997) (per curiam).
53. Fox, 745 So. 2d at 333.
54. David L. Kian, The 1996 Amendments to the Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442
- Reconciling a Decade of Confusion, 71 FLA. B.J. 32, 35 (July/Aug. 1997).
[Vol. 28:3:841
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B. Rule 1.442 of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule 1.442 of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure is in place for the
same purpose as section 768.79 of the Florida Statutes, which "is to encour-
age settlements and eliminate trials whenever possible by imposing cost
sanctions against an offeree who fails to accept a timely offer which equals
or exceeds the amount of the offeree's ultimate recovery."" However, be-
cause of discrepancies between the provisions in rule 1.442 and section
768.79, there has always been conflict among litigants and courts regarding
offers of judgment.5 6 As a result, rule 1.442 does not fulfill its intended pur-
pose to alleviate the judicial system of its burdensome caseload; instead, it
adds to it.57
Consequently, in 1988, the Supreme Court of Florida noted the continu-
ing conflict and asked "the Civil Procedure Rules Committee (the 'Commit-
tee') to examine" the problem.58 When the court did not think that the
Committee had come up with a satisfactory decision in 1989, the court sub-
stituted its own method, which combined parts of section 768.79 with rule
1.442, resulting in a custom tailored provision.59 At the same time, the court
ensured the support of its new rule and held "[t]o the extent the procedural
aspects of new rule 1.442 are inconsistent with sections 768.79 and 45.061,
the rule shall supersede the statutes. '60 Unfortunately, the Supreme Court of
Florida was not specific enough and much of the conflict continued.6'
In 1992, attempting to put an end to the confusion that continued in the
trial and appellate courts, the Supreme Court of Florida decided Timmons v.
Combs.62 In Timmons, rule 1.442 of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure
and section 768.79 of the Florida Statutes were procedurally in conflict, and
55. Cheek v. McGowan Elec. Supply Co., 511 So. 2d 977, 981 (Fla. 1987) (per curiam);
see also Unicare Health Facilities, Inc. v. Mort, 553 So. 2d 159, 161 (Fla. 1989) (reasoning
that rule 1.442 of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure is in place to prevent necessity of judi-
cial interaction).
56. Littky-Rubin, supra note 17, at 12 (citing Sec. Prof'Is, Inc. v. Segall, 685 So. 2d
1381, 1384 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997)); see also Timmons v. Combs, 608 So. 2d 1, 1-2
(Fla. 1992) (clarifying that section 45.061 and section 768.79 of the Florida Statutes are also
similar because both allow awards of attorney's fees, but under section 45.061 the award is
granted only if the settlement is unreasonably rejected). See generally Kian, supra note 54, at
36 n.2 (explaining section 45.061 not applicable to claims arising after October 1, 1990).
57. Littky-Rubin, supra note 17, at 12.
58. Fla. Bar Re: Amendment to Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 1.442, 550 So. 2d 442
(Fla. 1989) (per curiam).
59. Kian, supra note 54, at 34.
60. Fla. Bar Re: Amendment, 550 So. 2d at 443.
61. Kian,supra note 54, at 34.
62. 608 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1992).
2004)
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caused the court to address the proper process for obtaining attorney's fees
by using offers of judgment.63 In its opinion, the court repealed rule 1.442,
and stated that because section 768.79 was the only current statute on offers
of judgment, the court would use its procedural powers to implement the
procedural aspects of section 768.79 as its own rule 1.442.64
Rule 1.442 of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, as adopted in
Timmons, continued to be the standard until 1996, when it was once again
amended, and changed to include the supreme court's decision in Timmons.65
The committee in charge of analyzing the needed amendments to rule 1.442
noted that the new rule was an attempt to resolve the continuing problems the
courts had construing the rule.6 6 They added that the new rule 1.442 "super-
sedes those sections of the Florida Statutes and the prior decisions of the
court, where reconciliation is impossible, in order to provide a workable
structure for proposing settlements in civil actions. 67
After being amended once more in 2000, rule 1.442 of the Florida
Rules of Civil Procedure still reflects the recommendations of the committee
in 1996.61 It is valid for all offers or proposals for settlement, "and super-
sedes all other provisions of the rules and statutes that may be inconsistent
with this rule."6 9 Among its various provisions, the rule lists procedural re-
quirements that an offer of judgment must satisfy.7° The specific language of
63. Id. at 3.
64. Id.
65. In re Amendments to Fla. Rules, 682 So. 2d 105, 125-26 (Fla. 1996) (per curiam)
(underlining omitted). The "rule was amended to reconcile, where possible, sections ...
768.79, [of the] Florida Statutes, and the decisions of the Florida Supreme Court in... TGI
Friday's, Inc. v. Dvorak, 663 So. 2d 606 (Fla. 1995), and Timmons v. Combs, 608 So. 2d I
(Fla. 1992)." Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 126 (underlining omitted).
68. See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.442(a).
69. Id.
70. See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.442(c). The requirements for offers of judgment under rule
1.442 of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure are as follows:
(c) Form and Content of Proposal for Settlement.
(I) A proposal shall be in writing and shall identify the applicable Florida law under which it is
being made.
(2) A proposal shall:
(A) name the party or parties making the proposal and the party or parties to whom the pro-
posal is being made;
(B) identify the claim or claims the proposal is attempting to resolve;
(C) state with particularity any relevant conditions;
(D) state the total amount of the proposal and state with particularity all nonmonetary terms
of the proposal;
(E) state with particularity the amount proposed to settle a claim for punitive damages, if
any;
[Vol. 28:3:841
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rule 1.442 allows joint offers by noting, "[a] proposal may be made by or to
any party or parties and by or to any combination of parties properly identi-
fied in the proposal."'" Also, rule 1.442 delves further into the specificities
of joint proposals with a provision that is in the middle of most of the con-
flict and insists "[a] joint proposal shall state the amount and terms attribut-
able to each party. '72
C. The Statute and Rule in Conflict
Presently, section 768.79 of the Florida Statutes is the only statute that
governs offers of judgment. After years of revising and amending rule 1.442
of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, it would seem that the statute and
rule should be in complete accord; however, there is still a problem when
using section 768.79 and rule 1.442. The problem stems from the 1996
amendment of rule 1.442 that was partially implemented to correspond with
the Supreme Court of Florida's decision in Fabre v. Marin,73 which required
the comparison of fault among all defendants. 74  As a result, even though
section 768.79 has no such requirement, 75 rule 1.442 differs, and specifically
requires that offers of judgment be apportioned among multiple parties.76
Clearly, the difference in the requirements of rule 1.442 and section
768.79 cause difficulties since the rule requires something that the statute
makes no mention of. The inconsistency makes it difficult for attorneys to
serve legally sufficient offers of judgment when there is a conflict in the law.
Usually, the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure provide attorneys with clear
procedural requirements, but when substantive law conflicts with a rule, in-
terpretation tends to vary among attorneys and judges. The requirement of
apportionment in offers of judgment is found in the Florida Rules of Civil
Procedure.77 However, the provision must be analyzed to see if it is truly
(F) state whether the proposal includes attorneys' fees and whether attorneys' fees are part
of the legal claim; and
(G) include a certificate of service in the form required by rule 1.080(f).
FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.442(c)(l)-(2).
71. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.442(c)(3).
72. Id.
73. 623 So. 2d 1182 (Fla. 1993). The court held joint and several liability applicable to
economic damages, and required the jury to apportion fault among the parties who contributed
to the injury. Id. at 1185.
74. Littky-Rubin, supra note 17, at 14.
75. See § 768.79(2002).
76. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.442(c)(3).
77. See id.
2004]
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procedural, and thus controlling, since many areas of substantive and proce-
dural law overlap or conflict.78
A test cited by the Supreme Court of Florida is that "[p]ractice and pro-
cedure encompass the course, form, manner, means, method, mode, order,
process or steps by which a party enforces substantive rights or obtains re-
dress for their invasion. 'Practice and procedure' may be described as the
machinery of the judicial process as opposed to the product thereof."79 The
requirement to include specific apportionments in an offer of judgment is a
method or step to enforce substantive rights and, therefore, it is a procedural
requirement.
The Florida Constitution addresses the power of the courts over proce-
dure. o Article V, § 2 states: "The supreme court shall adopt rules for the
practice and procedure in all courts .... 8' Article V, § 2, does give the leg-
islature the power to retract procedural rules; however, nowhere in Article V,
or the rest of the Florida Constitution, does the legislature have procedural
rulemaking power.82
Since the Supreme Court of Florida has the ultimate procedural power,
when a statute attempts to control procedure in a way that conflicts with, or
encroaches on, the power of the court to create rules, the legislature's statute
is required to acquiesce to the court's rule.83 A case on point is Leapai v.
Milton,8 4 where section 45.061 of the Florida Statutes was found to be in
conflict with rule 1.442 of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. In its
holding, the Supreme Court of Florida was able to filter out the substantive
law in the statute, allowing rule 1.442 to control the procedure and act in
conjunction with only the substantive aspects of section 45.06 1.86
78. In re Clarification of Fla. Rules of Practice & Procedure, 281 So. 2d 204 (Fla. 1973)
(per curiam).
79. In re Fla. Rules of Criminal Procedure, 272 So. 2d 65, 66 (Fla. 1972) (per curiam).
80. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 2(a) (1885).
81. Id.
82. Carmel v. Carmel, 282 So. 2d 9, 10 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1973) (per curiam). The
legislature required awards of attorneys' fees to be remanded, but the Third District Court of
Appeal found the law was beyond legislative powers and invalid because it was a procedural
rule. Id. The district court stated:
while the legislature could, pursuant to the Constitution, repeal a rule of practice adopted by
the Supreme Court, it was without constitutional authority to promulgate a rule of practice or
procedure for the appellate or trial courts, to operate as a substitute or an alternative to the rule
thus repealed, or otherwise.
Id.
83. Ong v. Mike Guido Props., 668 So. 2d 708, 710 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (citing
Leapai v. Milton, 595 So. 2d 12, 15 (Fla. 1992)).
84. 595 So. 2d 12 (Fla. 1992).
85. Id. at 15.
86. Id.
[Vol. 28:3:841
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That same reasoning is found in the supreme court's opinion regarding
the 1989 amendments to the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, where the
court held that rule 1.442 would supercede any conflicting provisions in sec-
tion 768.79 of the Florida Statutes.87 The actual language of the rule follows
the same train of thought and provides for its own superiority.88
Thus, the fact that section 768.79 does not address apportioning offers
of judgment among multiple parties is of no consequence. As a procedural
rule implementing section 768.79, rule 1.442 has priority and requires that
any offers of judgment "state the amount and terms attributable to each
party."s9
III. JOINT OFFERS
As previously noted, the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure permit joint
offers of judgment by stating: "[a] proposal may be made by or to any party
or parties and by or to any combination of parties properly identified in the
proposal." 9° While, section 768.79 of the Florida Statutes is silent on this
issue, the case law of this state illustrate that Florida courts have continu-
ously accepted joint offers. 9'
One case that exemplifies the courts' continuing acceptance of joint of-
fers is Government Employees Insurance Co. v. Thompson,92 decided by the
Second District Court of Appeal.93 In Thompson, the court disagreed with
the appellee's argument that the joint offer of judgment, proposed by the two
offerors, was invalid because it was not joint and several.94 The court ration-
alized its decision to permit the joint offer by indicating that they "found no
cases that hold a joint offer invalid per se, while numerous cases have recog-
nized, without comment, the validity of joint offers."95
Similarly, in V.LP. Real Estate Corp. v. Florida Executive Realty Man-
agement Corp.,96 the appellants argued that attorney's fees should not have
been awarded, because the demand for judgment submitted by the appellee
87. Fla. Bar Re: Amendment to Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 1.442, 550 So. 2d 442,
443 (Fla. 1989).
88. See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.442(a).
89. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.442(c)(3).
90. Id.
91. JAMES C. HAUSER, ATTORNEY'S FEES IN FLORIDA 4-52 (2d ed. 2002).
92. 641 So. 2d 189 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 190.
95. Id. The court further stated that the character of the offer as a joint offer, might be
relevant on remand to the analysis of whether an offer is made in good faith. Id.
96. 650 So. 2d 199 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (per curiam).
2004]
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was invalid for being a joint offer.97 Denying the appellants' argument, the
Fourth District Court of Appeal found that on other occasions, Florida courts
recognized joint offers and that in the instant case, the joint offer of judgment
was valid.98
Given that cases clearly interpret section 768.79 of the Florida Statutes
and the language of rule 1.442 of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure to
permit joint offers, under Florida law the use of a joint offer of judgment is
not objectionable.99 However, while there is no question that joint offers are
permitted, confusion arises in the implementation of such offers. Although
rule 1.442 clearly states that joint offers "shall state the amount and terms
attributable to each party,'"' that amended provision requiring apportion-
ment did not become effective until January 1, 1997."1 Thus, there was a
problem of various courts' interpretations of the amendment's retroactive
effect, and the requirement that offers of judgment shall be apportioned
among multiple parties."'
A. Offers to Multiple Offerees
Courts have strictly interpreted the effect that the amended portion of
rule 1.442 has on offers of judgment, served to multiple offerees, after the
amendment became effective in 19 9 7 .103 However, there was a split among
the courts on the issue of whether offers of judgment served prior to the
amendment's effective date had to be apportioned among multiple parties."°
The uncertainty questioned whether the amended provision was retroactively
affective on offers of judgment served prior to 1997; or whether section
768.79, or the former version of rule 1.422, had the same, or similar re-
quirements as the current rule's apportionment specification.'05
97. Id. at 201.
98. Id. (citing Thompson, 641 So. 2d at 190).
99. See Thompson, 641 So. 2d at 190; V.IP. Real Estate, 650 So. 2d at 201.
100. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.442(c)(3).
101. Allstate Indem. Co. v. Hingson, 808 So. 2d 197, 199 n.2 (Fla. 2002) (per curiam).
102. Pappas & Walford, supra note 22, at 72. Specifically, multiple decisions have dif-
fered on apportionment among offers from joint offerors. Id.
103. Id. at 69; e.g. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, v. Behar, 752 So. 2d 663, 664 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 2000); see also Ford Motor Co. v. Meyers, 771 So. 2d 1202, 1204 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 2000) (holding that offer of judgment to multiple defendants must provide the specific
amount for each party even if there is an indemnification agreement between the defendants).
104. Allstate Indem. Co. v. Hingson, 774 So. 2d 44 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (per
curiam).
105. See id.; see generally HAUSER, supra note 91 (discussing the various decisions of the
Florida District Courts of Appeal).
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Bodek v. Gulliver Academy, Inc., 106 a Third District Court of Appeal
case, addressed the issue and found that apportionment was not required for
offers served prior to the 1997 amendment.'0 7 In Bodek, the plaintiffs were
served with an offer of judgment in 1993.08 In its December 1997 decision,
the court found that the words "'the Plaintiffs' in the offer fulfilled the pro-
visions of section 768.79 as applicable to multiple plaintiffs.'09 The court
went further to deny the Bodeks' contrasting arguments, and found no re-
quirement of apportionment in section 768.79 of the Florida Statutes." °
However, the court did note in dicta that rule 1.442 of the Florida Rule of
Civil Procedure had been amended. "'
The Fourth District Court of Appeal followed the Third District Court
of Appeal's analysis, in Herzog v. K-Mart Corp.," 2 a slip and fall case in
which K-Mart served an offer of judgment on the plaintiffs in 1996."' The
court denied any requirement for apportionment among multiple parties,
stating that before the 1997 amendment to rule 1.442, neither the rule, nor
section 768.79, required that offers of judgment be apportioned among mul-
tiple parties. 114 It further held that K-Mart's "offer of judgment, served prior
to the amendment to the rule, was not rendered ineffective to trigger the
sanctions of the statute merely because it was a joint offer which failed to
specify the amount attributable to each plaintiff.""' 5
Conversely, the Second District Court of Appeal took an entirely differ-
ent approach than the Third and Fourth District Courts of Appeal."16 In 1996,
before the amendment to rule 1.442 became effective, the Second District
Court of Appeal decided Twiddy v. Guttenplan."7  In Twiddy, an offer of
judgment was filed on behalf of two defendants who agreed to pay the plain-
106. 702 So. 2d 1331 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (per curiam).
107. Id. at 1332.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Bodek, 702 So. 2d at 1332. In its note, the Third District Court of Appeal illustrates
how the Bodeks' arguments were in line with the new amendment, but makes no mention of
how, or if, it would retroactively affect this decision. Id. at 1332 n. 1.
112. 760 So. 2d 1006 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000), overruled in part by Allstate Indem.
Co. v. Hingson, 808 So. 2d 197 (Fla. 2002).
113. See id. at 1009.
114. Id.
115. Id.; see also V.I.P. Real Estate Corp. v. Fla. Executive Realty Mgmt. Corp., 650 So.
2d 199, 200-01 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (per curiam) (holding that single demand for
judgment made to both appellants, was invalid because joint offers were permitted).
116. See Allstate indem. Co. v. Hingson, 774 So. 2d 44, 44 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
117. 678 So. 2d 488 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
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tiff $5000 in exchange for a release applicable to all defendants.' 8 In render-
ing the decision the court noted that the total offer on behalf of both defen-
dants was for $5000, making it
impossible to determine the amount attributable to each offeree in
order to make a further determination whether the judgment
against only one of the offerees for $2,100 was at least twenty-five
percent less than the offer on her behalf. The fact that the offer
was made on behalf of two defendants who were not joint tortfea-
sors makes the necessary determinations as to the applicability of
section 768.79 impossible to perform with any certainty. "9
Thus, the court denied any entitlement to an award of attorney's fees,
not in reference to rule 1.442, but because it found that the offer of judgment
was not specific enough to comply with the requirements of section 768.79
of the Florida Statutes. 
20
Four years later, in March of 2000, the Second District Court of Appeal
followed its Twiddy judgment with a similar decision in C & S Chemicals,
Inc. v. McDougald.'21 C & S Chemicals relates how in 1996, the plaintiffs
served a joint demand for judgment, but failed to apportion the amount
among the three defendants. 22 Since the failure to apportion the demand
prevented the defendants from applying their "right to evaluate the 1996 de-
mand independently based on their individual liability situations," the Sec-
ond District Court of Appeal decided that the demand for judgment was un-
enforceable, and there was no entitlement to attorney's fees. 23 When resolv-
ing the problem, the court mentioned that the 1997 amendment to rule 1.442
of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure was not effective in regards to this
demand. 24 The court held that prior cases, such as Twiddy, unmistakably
stood for the same interpretation of section 768.79 and earlier versions of the
rule, which required apportionment.2 5
Later the same year, the conflicts between the district courts came to a
head in Allstate Indemnity Co. v. Hingson 26 At that time, the Second Dis-
trict Court of Appeal affirmed the circuit court's holding that attorney's fees
118. Id. at 489.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. 754 So. 2d 795 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (per curiam).
122. Id. at 796.
123. Id. at 798.
124. Id. at 797 n.3.
125. Id. at 797-98.
126. 774 So. 2d 44 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (per curiam).
[Vol. 28:3:841
14
Nova Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 3 [2004], Art. 16
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol28/iss3/16
APPORTIONING JOINT OFFERS OF JUDGMENT
could not be awarded for an offer of judgment in which the offeror failed to
apportion the amount offered for two plaintiffs' claims.'27 The district court
of appeal also specifically mentioned the conflict between the courts, citing
the Fourth District Court of Appeal's decision in Herzog v. K-Mart.2 8
Thus, when the Supreme Court of Florida was faced with the appeal of
Allstate Indemnity Co. v. Hingson'29 it cited its jurisdiction from the district
courts' conflict between Hingson and Herzog.130 In the appeal of Hingson,
the question proposed by the court was "whether the former version of Flor-
ida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442 required an offer of settlement made by a
defendant to multiple plaintiffs to state the amount and terms attributable to
each plaintiff.' 3' Citing to C & S Chemical and United Services Automobile
Ass 'n v. Behar, 32 the Supreme Court of Florida remarked on the purpose of
section 768.79, and the requirement of apportionment, which promotes the
statutory objective by allowing an offeree to evaluate the specific terms of
the offer personal to that offeree.' 33 Furthering the importance of the point,
the court reasoned that if there is no specific basis to ascertain the exact
amount an individual was offered, there is no way to compare it to see if the
judgment is within twenty-five percent of the offer. 134 The court presented
additional support by interpreting legislative intent in section 768.79, finding
"'party' in the singular . . . [to indicate] intent that an offer specify the
amount attributable to each individual party.' ' 135 Accordingly, the Supreme
Court of Florida followed the reasoning of the Second District Court of Ap-
peal, and held that rule 1.442 and section 768.79, both before, and after the
127. Id.
128. Id.; see Herzog v. K-Mart Corp., 760 So. 2d 1006 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
129. 808 So. 2d 197 (Fla. 2002) (per curiam).
130. Id.; see FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(3). The Supreme Court of Florida has the power
to:
review any decision of a district court of appeal that expressly declares valid a state statute, or
that expressly construes a provision of the state or federal constitution, or that expressly affects
a class of constitutional or state officers, or that expressly and directly conflicts with a decision
of another district court of appeal or of the supreme court on the same question of law.
Id.
131. Hingson, 808 So. 2d at 199 (footnote omitted).
132. 752 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2000). A single defendant served an offer of
judgment after the 1997 amendment became effective. Id. at 664. However, the defendant
failed to fully comply with rule 1.442, and because the offer was served as a "lump sum
amount" that did not provide the necessary specifics as to each of the two plaintiffs, it was
defective, and no attorney's fees were awarded. Id.
133. Hingson, 808 So. 2d at 199. The purpose, or statutory objective, of section 768.79 is
as a "tool to encourage" the parties to settle. Kaufman v. Smith, 693 So. 2d 133, 134 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (Hazouri, J., concurring).
134. Hingson, 808 So. 2d at 199.
135. Allstate Indem. Co. v. Hingson, 7800 So. 2d 197, 199 (Fla. 2002) (per curiam).
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1997 amendment, require that offers of judgment to multiple parties be ap-
portioned to each offeree.1
3 6
After the Hingson decision, and the amendment to rule 1.442 of the
Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, the courts still found exceptions in wrong-
ful death and vicarious liability cases, and have permitted awards of attor-
ney's fees for undifferentiated offers of judgment served to multiple offerees
in those two circumstances.'37 As discussed in Thompson v. Hodson,'38 in
which the personal representative of an estate received a valid "lump-sum,
non-specific" proposal for settlement, a wrongful death case is atypical under
rule 1.442." 9 Whereas there might be multiple claimants, Florida law re-
quires that one plaintiff bring the action as the decedent's personal represen-
tative, and claim for the estate and all surviviors.' 40 The First District Court
of Appeal addressed this in a similar case, Dudley v. McCormick, 4' and
stated:
[a] defendant in a wrongful death action need not apportion a pro-
posed settlement among the estate and survivors on behalf of
whom the personal representative is acting in order to comply with
the requirements of section 768.79 and Florida Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 1.442. No such proposed apportionment would bind the
personal representative in any event.
42
This is because the representative, as a singular party, is authorized to
accept an offer and then later apportion it among the claimants, subject to
court approval if needed. 43 Since multiple parties cannot bring a wrongful
death action, the representative is viewed individually and is excepted from
the apportionment requirement.
The second exception in apportionment among offerees, is vicarious li-
ability, and although it was not addressed in the Supreme Court of Florida's
Hingson opinion, it is questionable after that ruling.'" In Strahan v.
Gauldin,45 the Fifth District Court of Appeal found an undifferentiated offer
136. Id.
137. See 4 HON. DAVID M. GERSTEN, FLORIDA CIVIL PRACTICE GUIDE 92-14 to 16 (2003).
138. 825 So. 2d 941 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2002), rev. denied, 835 So. 2d 266 (Fla.
2002).
139. See id. at 948-49.
140. Id. at 949 (citing FLA. STAT. § 768.20 (1993)).
141. 799 So. 2d 436 (Fla. I st Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
142. Id. at 441.
143. Hodson, 825 So. 2d at 950.
144. See HAUSER, supra note 91, at 4-55 to 58; GERSTEN, supra note 137, at 92-14 -16.
145. 756 So. 2d 158 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2000), overruled by Matetzschk v. Lamb, 849
So. 2d 1141 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
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of judgment to multiple offerees valid where two of the defendants were
vicariously liable to the third. 46  Holding that apportionment is illogical
when all the offerees are liable for everything, the court rationalized that
"[b]ecause of that joint and several liability, none of the individual defen-
dants were adversely affected by the joint offer."' 47 Following the same line
of reasoning, in Safelite Glass Corp. v. Samuel,148 the Fourth District Court
of Appeal found that a lack of differentiation in an offer was "no[t] harmful
error" and did not inhibit a true assessment of the offer, where one offeree
was vicariously liable for the other offeree's negligence. 49 Later case law
addresses these findings and their viability.
B. Offers from Multiple Offerors: The Divergence
While, with few exceptions, the apportionment rule regarding joint of-
ferees seemed to be clear, until recently the districts were split, with no clear
path to follow, concerning decisions of apportioning offers of judgment
among multiple offerors 5° Much of this disagreement between the district
courts concerns the purpose behind the amendment to rule 1.442 of the Flor-
ida Rules of Civil Procedure and the method of construction that should be
used in the interpretation of the rule.
In Flight Express, Inc. v. Robinson,'-' where two defendants made an
offer of judgment for $100 without stating the amount that each would con-
tribute, the Third District Court of Appeal reversed the circuit court's denial
of attorney's fees.1 2 The Third District Court of Appeal found that the of-
ferors should not be denied fees because a lack of apportionment among the
offerors would not make a difference on whether the offeree would accept
the proposal, and it "does not, impair the ability of the defendants ... to re-
cover under section 768.79. . . ."' Delving into the intent behind rule 1.442
146. Strahan, 756 So. 2d at 161.
147. Id.; see also Crowley v. Sunny's Plants, Inc., 710 So. 2d 219, 221 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1998) (holding a general joint offer to two defendants valid when represented by the
same attorney, with no conflict of interest between defendants and insurance company, and
when one defendant is vicariously liable for the other defendant's liability).
148. 771 So. 2d 44 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
149. Id. at 46; see also Ford Motor Co. v. Meyers, 771 So. 2d 1202, 1204 n.l (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (supporting vicarious liability exception in Safelite Glass by reference
that current case differed because the indemnification agreement between the parties did not
prevent recovery from a defendant).
150. Pappas & Walford, supra note 22, at 72.
151. 736 So. 2d 796 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1999), overruled in part by Willis Shaw Ex-
press, Inc. v. Hilyer Sod, Inc., 849 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 2003).
152. Flight Express, Inc., 736 So. 2d at 797.
153. Id.
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of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, the court indicated that the rule was
amended in 1997 to correspond with the decision in Fabre v. Marin.5 4 In
the court's view, the purpose of rule 1.442 is to prevent problems with multi-
ple offerees, and for that reason the failure of offerors to specifically follow
the rule creates no difficulties and "must be considered merely a harmless
technical violation which [does] not affect the rights of the parties." '
Following the Third District Court of Appeal, the Fourth District Courts
of Appeal decided Safelite Glass Corp. v. Samuel, a case where two plain-
tiffs, as offerors, did not indicate any partition in their offer.'56 The offer was
not accepted, but because the failure to apportion among the offerors was not
the reason, the district court affirmed the circuit court's award of attorney's
fees.' 57 Since rule 1.442 was created to protect multiple offerees, the Fourth
District Court of Appeal held that the failure to divide the damages in the
offer was not in error. 58 Similarly, in Spruce Creek Development Co., of
Ocala v. Drew,59 two plaintiffs did not indicate any differentiation in an
offer of judgment, but the Fifth District Court of Appeal found that the offer
"was not void for having failed to separate the offer... [because] [t]he lack
of apportionment between claimants is a matter of indifference to the defen-
dant.'
160
Again, the Second District Court of Appeal had a more stringent view
of the requirements for multiple offerors, this time for apportionment among
multiple offerors.16' The case of Allstate Insurance Co. v. Materiale162 is
another instance where two plaintiffs offered a proposal for settlement, but
neglected to separately indicate the amount and terms attributable to each
offeror. 163 Referring to United Services Automobile Ass'n v. Behar,"M the
Second District Court of Appeal held that the same requirements, found in
that case for offerees, apply to offerors.165 The court applied the same appor-
tionment requirements because an offeree who receives a proposal from mul-
154. Id. at797n.1;seeFabrev. Marin, 623 So. 2d 1182 (Fla. 1993).
155. Flight Express, Inc., 736 So. 2d at 797 n. 1.
156. Safelite Glass, 771 So. 2d at 45.
157. Id. at 46.
158. Satelite Glass Corp. v. Samuel, 771 So. 2d 44, 46 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
159. 746 So. 2d 1109 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1999), overruled in part by Willis Shaw
Express, Inc. v. Hilyer Sod, Inc., 849 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 2003), and overruled in part by
Matetzschk v. Lamb, 849 So. 2d 1141 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2003)).
160. Id. at l116.
161. See Pappas & Walford, supra note 22, at 72 (citing Clipper v. Bay Oaks Condo.
Ass'n, 810 So. 2d 541 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
162. 787 So. 2d 173 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
163. Id. at 174.
164. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n v. Behar, 752 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
165. Materiale, 787 So. 2d at 174-75.
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tiple offerors "is entitled to know the amount and terms of the offer that are
attributable to each offeror in order to evaluate the offer as it pertains to that
party."'66 The Second District Court of Appeal went even further, and ex-
pressly stated its disagreement with the decisions of the Fifth and Third Dis-
trict Courts of Appeal, certifying a conflict with Spruce Creek and Flight
Express. 167
Another Second District Court of Appeal case, Clipper v. Bay Oaks
Condominium Ass 'n, Inc.,'68 included an undifferentiated offer of judgment
from three offerors to one offeree, which caused the court to deny any enti-
tlement to attorney's fees. 169 The court cited its own strict compliance with
the rule, and found the offer flawed, because the offeree did not know what
particular amounts each of the offerors were presenting.
71
However, while noting that it did not apply in this case, in dicta the
Second District Court of Appeal recognized an exception to its requirement
of strict compliance of apportionment among multiple parties.' Citing a
previously decided case, Danner Construction Co. v. Reynolds Metals
Co., 72 the court stated "a failure to apportion may be harmless error if 'the
theory for the defendant's [sic] joint liability does not allow for apportion-
ment.' 173 In Danner Construction, the Second District Court of Appeal had
specifically stated that in no way should this exception be construed too
broadly, but in cases where there is vicarious liability among the defendant
offerors, there is no way to differentiate the parties' joint liability. 174 Thus,
166. Id. at 175.
167. Id. The Second District Court of Appeal opposed the Fifth District Court of Appeal
by reasoning that even if accepting the proposal would equally release the defendant from
both plaintiffs' claims, that defendant has the right to know how much of the agreement is
attributable to each party. Id. In regards to the Third District Court of Appeal, the Second
District Court of Appeal held that the finding of a "harmless technical violation" was incor-
rect, and the Second District Court of Appeal did "not agree that such failure is harmless. An
offer that requires an offeree to make an all or nothing determination regarding an offer made
by two parties, without permitting it to evaluate each claim separately, does affect the rights of
that party." Id.
168. 810 So. 2d 541 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
169. Id.
170. See id. at 542-43. The court stated:
Only two of the three offerors, the condominium association and Midnight Pass, prevailed
against Clipper. [Since] the proposal did not state the specific amount each defendant was
willing to pay, the circuit court had no way to determine whether the condominium association
and Midnight Pass had offered anything to settle the suit.
Id. at 543.
171. Id.at542.
172. 760 So. 2d 199 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
173. Clipper, 810 So. 2d at 542 (quoting Danner Constr., 760 So. 2d at 202).
174. Danner Constr., 760 So. 2d at 202.
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an offer of judgment that fails to apportion the amounts among the offerors
may be considered "a harmless violation of the rule."'' 75
Siding with the Second District Court of Appeal, the First District Court
of Appeal favored a strict interpretation of rule 1.442, in Hilyer Sod, Inc. v.
Willis Shaw Express, Inc.,'176 a case that would eventually result in an ulti-
mate decision on the issue from the Supreme Court of Florida. 177 In Hilyer
Sod, two plaintiffs joined their causes of action, and failing to apportion
damages among themselves, offered a joint settlement to the defendant. 178
The court required strict construction of section 768.79 of the Florida Stat-
utes and rule 1.442 of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, and found that
the plaintiffs offer of settlement was invalid, preventing an award of attor-
ney's fees under section 768.79.179 Accordingly, the First District Court of
Appeal also certified a conflict with Flight Express and Spruce Creek.8'
IV. THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA DECIDES WILLIS SHAW
A. Willis Shaw Express, Inc. v. Hilyer Sod, Inc.
181
Finally, in March 2003, the Supreme Court of Florida addressed the
years of conflict in the district courts and issued the Willis Shaw Express,
Inc. v. Hilyer Sod, Inc. opinion, in which the court endeavored to set forth a
definitive rule regarding apportioning offers of judgment. 182 Like the First
District Court of Appeal, the Supreme Court of Florida addressed the joint
proposal of settlement that was presented to the defendant Hilyer Sod, Inc.' 83
The proposal was from two plaintiffs to one defendant and pertinent portions
read as follows:
3. The proposal will require plaintiffs, WILLIS SHAW EXPRESS,
INC. and EDWARD McALP1NE, to sign a standard release in fa-
vor of defendant, HILYER SOD, INC., and to file a notice of dis-
missal with prejudice of the claims plaintiffs, WILLIS SHAW
EXPRESS, INC. and EDWARD McALPINE, have filed against
175. Id.
176. 817 So. 2d 1050 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
177. See Willis Shaw Express, Inc. v. Hilyer Sod, Inc., 849 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 2003), reh'g
denied, No. SC02-1521, 2003 Fla. LEXIS 1168, at *1 (Fla. June 26, 2003).
178. Hilyer Sod, 817 So. 2d at 1051-52.
179. Id. at 1054.
180. Id.
181. 849 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 2003).
182. See id.
183. Id. at 277.
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defendant, HILYER SOD, INC., in this action.
4. The total amount being offered with this proposal is NINETY-FIVE
THOUSAND ONE AND NO/100 DOLLARS ($95,001.00)." 4
As the plain language of this offer confirms, the offer failed to differen-
tiate terms or amounts between the offerors, and it did not afford the offeree
a chance to evaluate the proposal as it pertained to each plaintiff. In their
briefs to the Supreme Court of Florida, both the petitioners, and the respon-
dent, primarily focused on methods of interpreting section 768.79 of the
Florida Statutes and rule 1.442 of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure.185
The direct focus on differing methods of interpretation stemmed from the
First District Court of Appeal's ruling that required strict compliance. 186
Whichever method of interpretation the supreme court chose would result in
an absolute decision of the construction of the law governing apportionment
of offers of judgment.187
Petitioners, Willis Shaw Express and Edward McAlpine, argued that
according to section 768.79 and rule 1.442, there was no need to differentiate
between offerors, the offer they served on the defendant was valid, and they
were entitled to attorney's fees. 8s Their brief to the court maintained that
rule 1.442 "should be pragmatically, not strictly construed," and contended
that because it was a procedural rule, it "should be given an interpretation to
further justice not frustrate it.' 8 9
Conversely, the respondent, Hilyer Sod, requested that the supreme
court affirm the First District Court of Appeal's holding, and find the offer
invalid, because it was an undifferentiated offer and did not state the amounts
attributable to each offeror.'90 Further, the respondent claimed that both sec-
tion 768.79 of the Florida Statutes, and rule 1.442 of the Florida Rules of
Civil Procedure, should be strictly construed because they "are punitive in
nature and are in derogation of the common law."'19 Then, protecting itself
from any alternative analysis by the court, the petitioner further asserted that
184. Id. at 277-78 (quoting Hilyer Sod, 817 So. 2d at 1051-52).
185. See Petitioners' Initial Brief on the Merits at 28, Willis Shaw Express, Inc. v. Hilyer
Sod, Inc., 849 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 2003) (No. SC02-1521); Respondent's Answer Brief on the
Merits at 6, Willis Shaw Express, Inc. v. Hilyer Sod, Inc., 849 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 2003) (No.
SC02-1521).
186. Hilyer Sod, Inc. v. Willis Shaw Express, Inc., 817 So. 2d 1050, 1054 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 2002).
187. See Petitioners' Brief at 28, Willis Shaw (No. SC02-1521); Respondent's Brief at 6,
Willis Shaw (No. SC02-152 1).
188. Petitioners' Brief at 6, Willis Shaw (No. SC02-1521).
189. Id. at 27-28 (emphasis omitted).
190. Respondent's Brief at 6, Willis Shaw (No. SC02-1521).
191. Id. at 24 (emphasis omitted).
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"[i]f statute 768.79 or [rule] 1.442 are not strictly construed, then general
rules of construction would be applied,"'9 2 to give the language of the rule its
"plain and ordinary meaning," which would act to invalidate the offer.'93
Ultimately, the supreme court followed the respondent's reasoning, af-
firming the district court's finding that the proposal for settlement was inva-
lid for failure to follow the requirements of rule 1.442.194 In rendering its
decision, the court cited established case law, and presented two grounds on
which to base its decision that the language in rule 1.442 must be strictly
construed.'95 The first reason the court gave, was that, courts in Florida gen-
erally follow the common law American Rule, which does not allow for
awards of attorney's fees, and because rule 1.442 and section 768.79 are in
conflict with the common law, they have to be strictly construed. 9 6 Sec-
ondly, the court refered to "'a well-established rule in Florida that 'statutes
awarding attorney's fees must be strictly construed.'"'
97
Consequently, with strict construction of the plain language of rule
1.442, the Supreme Court of Florida overruled the decisions in Flight Ex-
press and Spruce Creek, which had assumed that a failure to differentiate
between offerors was of no consequence. 9 s Now, just as amounts of offers
of judgment must be apportioned among offerees, offerors must also allocate
the total among themselves. 99 Accordingly, the Willis Shaw decision clari-
fied the multitude of unreliable interpretations of section 768.79 of the Flor-
ida Statutes and rule 1.442 of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure.200 The
Supreme Court of Florida conclusively held that the use of section 768.79
and rule 1.442 requires that the "language must be strictly construed.
20
'
192. Id. at 28 (emphasis omitted).
193. Id. at 29 (quoting Castillo v. Vlaminck de Castillo, 771 So. 2d 609, 611 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 2000) (citing In re McCollam, 612 So. 2d 572, 573 (Fla. 1993))).
194. See Willis Shaw Express, Inc. v. Hilyer Sod, Inc., 849 So. 2d 276, 279 (Fla. 2003),
reh 'g denied, 2003 Fla. LEXIS 1168, at *1 (Fla. June 26, 2003).
195. Id. at 278.
196. Id.; see Major League Baseball v. Morsani, 790 So. 2d 1071, 1077-78 (Fla. 2001).
"This court has held that a statute enacted in derogation of the common law must be strictly
construed and that, even where the Legislature acts in a particular area, the common law re-
mains in effect in that area unless the statute specifically says otherwise .... Id.
197. Willis Shaw, 849 So. 2d at 278. (quoting Dade County v. Pefia, 664 So. 2d 959, 960
(Fla. 1995) (quoting Gershuny v. Martin McFall Messenger Anesthesia Prof I Ass'n, 539 So.
2d 1131, 1132 (Fla. 1989))); see also Peha, 664 So. 2d at 960 (holding that Florida courts
must heed the "plain and unambiguous language" in the law) (citing Citizens of State v. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n, 425 So. 2d 534, 541-42 (Fla. 1982)).
198. Willis Shaw, 849 So. 2d at 279.
199. Id. at 278.
200. Id.
201. Id.
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B. Is There Still a Vicarious Liability Exception?
The Supreme Court of Florida intended Willis Shaw to be the final deci-
sion on apportioning offers of judgment. Nevertheless, in the two months
that followed the court's decision, cases emerged that suggest there still may
be an exception to Willis Shaw. No exceptions were addressed anywhere in
the supreme court's opinion, but it would seem that the court's designation
requiring strict interpretation of section 768.79 and rule 1.442 was an all-
encompassing decision. °2
The Fifth District Court of Appeal did follow Willis Shaw, strictly inter-
preting section 768.79 and rule 1.442 in Matetzschk v. Lamb, °3 where the
plaintiff had failed to apportion an offer of judgment between two defendants
on the basis of vicarious liability.2° In its decision, the Fifth District Court
of Appeal applied the strict construction demanded in Willis Shaw and re-
versed the trial judge's award of attorney's fees. 25 The court expressly de-
nied any vicarious liability exception, and stated that the court's previous
decision in Strahan, which allowed an exception, had been "implicitly re-
ject[ed]" by Willis Shaw.2 0 6
However, the Second District Court of Appeal followed a different line
of reasoning in Barnes v. Kellogg Co.20 7 and Crespo v. Woodland Lakes
Creative Retirement Concepts, Inc.20 8 Each case was decided in the two
months following the Willis Shaw decision, and in both the Second District
Court of Appeal found an exception to the rule of strict interpretation.2 9
In Barnes, two defendants, one of whom was strictly liable for the
other's error, served a joint proposal for settlement on the plaintiff, without
apportioning terms or amounts.2 '0 The Second District Court of Appeal re-
lated this situation in Barnes to the vicarious liability exception previously
established in Danner Construction, and held that because the defendants in
Barnes were joint and severally liable, the proposal was valid.21 ' Justifying
202. See Willis Shaw Express, Inc. v. Hilyer Sod, Inc., 849 So. 2d 276, 279 (Fla. 2003).
203. 28 Fla. L. Weekly DI 148 (5th Dist. Ct. App. May 9, 2003), opinion corrected and
superceded by No. 5D02-455, 2003 WL 21672984, at *1 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. July 18,
2003) (re-emphasizing the holding of the Fifth District Court of Appeal and rejecting the
Second District Court of Appeal's analysis).
204. Id.
205. Id. at D1149.
206. Id.
207. 846 So. 2d 568 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
208. 845 So. 2d 342 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
209. See id. at 343; Barnes, 846 So. 2d at 571.
210. Barnes, 846 So. 2d at 569.
211. ld. at 571-72.
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its decision, the court noted that the purpose of section 768.79 is to act as a
catalyst towards settlement, and reasoned that unified joint offers in cases,
like Barnes, should be permitted in order to further that goal.212 The court
did not ignore Willis Shaw; instead, the court claimed that Willis Shaw had
been thoroughly considered in the Second District Court of Appeal's deci-
sion that it did not overturn Danner Construction.213 The court said, "we do
not interpret that opinion [Willis Shaw] ... as prohibiting the offer made in
this case under these circumstances., ,2 4 Thus, through its decision, not only
did the Second District Court of Appeal uphold a vicarious liability excep-
tion, but it broadened that exception to all circumstances of joint and several
liability.215
Less than a month later, the Second District Court of Appeal supported
a vicarious liability exception in Crespo.21 6 Without mentioning the Willis
Shaw decision, the court found an offer of judgment invalid because the pro-
posal to two plaintiffs did not apportion the total between the plaintiffs.1 7
However, in dicta, the court noted the validity of the vicarious liability ex-
ception to rule 1.442, found in Danner Construction, and explained,
"[b]ecause apportionment is considered impossible in a vicarious liability
case, the courts have relieved the parties of the requirement to apportion the
offer in that type of case. 218
Therefore, once again there are conflicting decisions among the District
Courts of Appeal. It remains to be seen if the rest of the district courts will
follow the Fifth District Court of Appeal and strictly interpret the Willis
Shaw decision as all-encompassing, or if they will follow the Second District
Court of Appeal and the liberal construction of the holding that allows for an
exception.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court of Florida meant for Willis Shaw to be the final rul-
ing regarding apportioning offers of judgment. The court clearly required
strict interpretation of section 768.89 of the Florida Statutes and rule 1.442
of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. Strict interpretation of the plain
language results in the requirement that all offerees, and all offerors, appor-
212. ld. at 572.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. See Barnes, 846 So. 2d at 571-72.
216. Crespo, 845 So. 2d at 343-44.
217. Id. at 343.
218. Id. at 344.
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tion offers of judgment among multiple parties. Joint offers are common,
and the requirement that offerors differentiate among multiple parties pro-
tects everyone involved, especially the offerees. No matter if the offeree is a
plaintiff or defendant, the offeree must be able to inspect the offer as it per-
tains to him personally. Otherwise, the offer is not clearly defined in regards
to each party involved. This results in a multitude of problems, including
further litigation, especially if judgment is not rendered on all of the parties.
A strict construction of the law allows no exceptions, and acts to protect
every party, which is what the supreme court intended with its Willis Shaw
decision.
However, within two months of the supreme court's decision, the Sec-
ond and Fifth District Courts of Appeal issued different decisions on the ap-
plicability of the rule on undifferentiated offers pertaining to joint and sev-
eral liability. With a disagreement so soon after Willis Shaw, more are sure
to follow. Most likely, the Supreme Court of Florida will have to make an-
other decision on this issue that appears so frequently throughout the Florida
courts.
In fact, because of the of the extensive conflict, the Fifth District Court
of Appeal sought to strengthen its viewpoint and issued a corrected opinion
of Matetzschk v. Lamb.219 In the new opinion, the court criticized the Barnes
and Crespo decisions of the Second District Court of Appeal. The Fifth Dis-
trict Court of Appeal maintained that "the language of Willis Shaw is appli-
cable whether the offer emanates from joint plaintiffs or is directed to joint
defendants," and the supreme court decision unquestionably requires appor-
tionment for every joint offer.220 The Fifth District Court of Appeal also
reasoned that the decisions of the Second District Court of Appeal were "in-
consistent with the purpose and language of the rule," especially since vi-
carious liability is such a disputed issue in most cases.22'
As the Fifth District Court of Appeal remarked, vicarious liability is a
frequently litigated issue. Since, in many cases, liability is not established
until the final judgment, the allegedly vicariously liable party may not even
be part of the case when attorney's fees are awarded. If attorney's fees are
awarded as a result of a lump-sum, joint offer, there is no way to tell what
amount each party is responsible for. The confusion over responsibility is
very likely to lead to judicial intervention, which is in complete degradation
of the purpose of both, rule 1.442 of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure
and section 768.79 of the Florida Statutes. Therefore, the strict construction
219. 849 So. 2d 1141 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
220. Id. at 1144.
221. Id.
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of rule 1.442 and section 768.79, required by the Supreme Court of Florida,
in Willis Shaw, does not allow for any exceptions, not even if it is only a
harmless technical error. Offers of judgment must be apportioned among
every party.
This frequently litigated area will continue to confuse attorneys and
courts alike. Attorneys repeatedly use offers of judgment to protect their
own liability, to ensure that they are paid, and to safeguard their clients' in-
terests. Attorneys cannot afford to lose an award of fees for failing to follow
the rules concerning offers of judgment. Therefore, they must apportion the
terms and amounts of an offer to each party, no matter if offeror, offeree,
plaintiff, or defendant. Using such a strict construction, and following every
letter of the rule, is the only way to ensure that the courts will not invalidate
an offer of judgment.
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